INTRODUCTION
The problem how to allocate the total production cost of a single homogeneous good is discussed in this paper. A cost function C, i.e. a nondecreasing function on the nonnegative reals which intersects the origin, is used to model the production costs depending on the demanded Ž . quantity. Here C y should be interpreted as the cost for producing y units of the good. If the agents or players in a finite group N possess the production technology and agent i has demand q , then the question how i Ž . to divide the total cost C Ý q among the players is answered in
general by proposing any cost sharing rule. Several applications occur in Ž . the literature see, e.g., Shenker, 1989 Shenker, , 1990 A cost sharing rule assigns an allocation to any cost sharing problem Ž . N, C,q, where q is the demand profile of the agents in N, and C is the cost function. This allocation has to be feasible in the sense that the proposed aggregate payment of the players covers the total cost. An example is average cost pricing. With respect to this rule every agent i has to pay her proportional part of the total cost. This means that average cost pricing only depends on the total cost and the demand profile, regardless of the special shape of the cost function. A further cost sharing rule, serial cost sharing, also takes into account the evaluation of the cost function at Ž . several distinguished arguments see Moulin and Shenker, 1992 . These Ž . authors see Moulin and Shenker, 1994 showed that both rules can be characterized by certain intuitive properties. They also proposed to consider the cost games generated by the cost sharing problems and apply classical solution concepts for games with transferable utility to these cost games. Indeed, they mentioned the Shapley value and nucleolus as possible cost sharing rules for the cost sharing problems. The present paper, which is organized as follows, discusses the game theoretical solutions in detail.
Ž In Section 1 the necessary notation is presented. It is shown see . Remark 1.3 and Fig. 1 that individual rationality, i.e. every player has to pay not more than her individual cost, cannot be a general property of a cost sharing rule. Indeed, individual costs may not cover total cost. Consequently, individual rationality is dropped as a property for cost sharing rules in general. In view of this fact we define the nucleolus rule to be the prenucleolus of the corresponding cost game. Well-known intuitive properties for cost sharing rules, e.g. Pareto optimality, ''equal treatment of Ž . equals,'' the null property players with zero demands do not have to pay , monotonicity, and additivity properties, are defined formally. Moreover, it is shown that similar well-accepted properties for solution concepts on games imply the properties on cost sharing problems. In order to translate a cost sharing rule into a solution concept on the arising cost games this rule should yield the same result in case it is applied to different cost sharing problems which possess the same induced cost game. A slightly stronger property is ''covariance under strategical equivalence.'' Average cost pricing does not satisfy covariance. The solution concept which arises from a covariant cost sharing rule inherits many properties of the rule as shown in Corollary 1.8. Covariance is the basic property of the game theoretical cost sharing rules discussed in the following sections.
In Section 2 three different axiomatizations of the Shapley rule are presented. The common properties of all characterizations are covariance Ž and equal treatment of equals i.e., agents with coinciding demands are . proposed to pay coinciding amounts . Together with the null property and Ž additivity i.e., if the cost function is the sum of two cost functions, then . everybody has to pay the sum of the fees of both cost sharing problems or Ž . minmax additivity a modification of additivity Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 are Ž . Ž . similar to the results of Shapley 1953 and Dubey 1975 . Here covariance is strongly used and cannot be replaced by Pareto optimality as in the classical context. Especially Theorem 2.2 is not a trivial analogue to Dubey's result, which is emphasized by the fact that in the cost sharing context these properties are not strong enough to uniquely determine the Shapley rule on the restricted class of cost sharing problems which generate monotonic simple cost games. Note that Dubey's result holds for this class of games. In a further axiomatization null property and additivity are replaced by some reduction property which is analogous to that introduced Ž . by Hart and Mas-Colell 1989 . Clearly, consistency can only be applied to classes of cost sharing problems with varying sets of agents.
In Sections 3 and 4 further versions of consistency are introduced and it Ž is shown that both the nucleolus rule and the antinucleolus rule i.e., the . prenucleolus of the dual cost game can be axiomatized by some version of Ž consistency, covariance, and equal treatment of equals see Theorems 3.4 . and 4.2 . As in the game theoretical context the infinity assumption on the Ž . set of potential agents is needed as a prerequisite see Sobolev, 1975 . Moreover, two interesting results concerning cost sharing problems with concave cost functions are presented. A strong version of consistency, together with equal treatment and covariance, uniquely determines the Ž . nucleolus even in case of a finite universe of players see Theorem 3.3 . In general, the antinucleolus is, other than the nucleolus rule, not a core selector, even in case that the core is nonempty. In Corollary 4.4 it is proved that the antinucleolus is a core selector in the case of concave cost functions. This fact also shows that the class of induced cost games does not cover, even up to strategical equivalence, the class of all concave games. This is in contrast to the general case; every game is, up to strategi-Ž cal equivalence, an induced game of some cost sharing problem see . Lemma 1.6 .
Finally, in Section 5 the cost functions which yield coinciding average cost pricing, Shapley rule, and nucleolus rules, when applied to a cost sharing problem with a fixed aggregate demand, are characterized by a Ž . functional equation see Theorem 5.1 . Concerning this class of cost sharing problems any of the proposed cost sharing rules can be character-Ž ized by ''separable costs'' i.e., coincidence with average cost pricing for . linear cost functions , monotonicity, and Pareto optimality. For average Ž cost pricing this characterization holds in general see Moulin and Shenker Ž .. 1994 . Moreover, Theorem 5.3 shows that linear and parabolic cost functions are the unique functions which globally yield coinciding cost sharing rules. Section 6 presents diagrams which summarize the main results.
NOTATION AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Let U denote the nonvoid set of potential agents; it can be finite or Ž . Ž . infinite. A triple N, C, q is called cost sharing problem CSP , if N is a Ž . finite nonvoid subset of U the set of agents of the CSP , C is a Ž . nondecreasing function on the nonnegative reals ‫ޒ‬ such that C 0 s 0
N the cost function of the CSP , and q s q g ‫ޒ‬ is such that q G 0
Ž . for i g N the demand profile of the CSP . Let ⌫ U denote the set of all cost sharing problems with the foregoing properties. A cost sharing rule
gate weight of S at x g ‫ޒ‬ N for S : N. Feasibility means that at least the Ž . total cost is covered by the agents. We do not require N, C, q G 0, but i in all our examples this property automatically holds. Well-known and intuitively justified properties of a CSR on ⌫ are as follows:
The mapping a a is called average cost pricing rule .
Ž Ž .. Note that average cost pricing distributes the total cost C q N among Ž the agents according to the Aumann᎐Shapley unit price see Aumann and . Shapley, 1974 . Note, furthermore , that average cost pricing is completely determined by the demand profile and the total cost. There is an example Ž of another CSR, namely serial cost sharing see Moulin and Shenker, . 1992 , which depends on both the demand profile and the cost function Ž evaluated at n arguments. Moulin and Shenker 1994 , Examples 3 and 4 of . Section 3 suggested looking at cost sharing rules which mainly depend on Ž . the cost function the demand profile is only used implicitly . They proposed the Shapley value and the nucleolus of a certain induced game as feasible cost sharing rules. To formulate this more explicitly it is necessary Ž . Ž C,q . to define the induced TU cost game N,¨of an arbitrary CSP Ž . N of S at x with respect to¨for x g ‫ޒ‬ . To put it more formally, let
. where ⌰ applied to a vector x S y¨S of excesses at x orders the S : N components of this vector nonincreasingly. The set Z is a singleton and its Ž . Ž unique element ¨is the prenucleolus of¨see Maschler, Peleg, and . Ž . Shapley, 1979 . In the definition of the nucleolus see Schmeidler, 1969 Ž .
X¨is replaced by the subset of individually rational preimputations.
The nucleolus rule on a subset ⌫ of ⌫ U assigns to each CSP Ž . Ž C ,q . N,C,q g⌫ the prenucleolus of its induced game N,¨. We denote this cost sharing rule by .
Ž .
3. The anti-nucleolus rule * on a subset ⌫ of ⌫ U assigns to each Ž . CSP N, C, q g ⌫ the negative of the prenucleolus of the negative of its
Ž . Remark 1. 3. i Note that the nucleolus in the sense of Schmeidler Ž does not necessarily exist; i.e., the set of imputations individually rational . preimputations of a game can be the empty set. This is also true for induced games of cost sharing problems. In Fig. 1 two 2-agent cost sharing problems with demand profiles q and q and the same ''S-shaped'' cost Ž function C are sketched. Note that S-shaped cost functions i.e., decreasing marginal costs for ''small'' aggregate demand and, due to, e.g., weak
. capacity bounds, increasing marginal costs for ''large'' aggregate demand are typical for many economical applications. For the demand profile q feasibility of a CSR requires at least one individual fee which is higher than the individual cost whereas in case of q the total cost can be divided among the players in such a way that both pay less than their individual costs. Therefore the version of a nucleolus rule based on individually rational feasible payoffs does not establish a cost sharing rule.
ii Using the notion of ''interpersonal comparisons of utility'' the Ž . prenucleolus can be justified for cost games see Maschler, 1992 . Al-FIG. 1. ''S-shaped'' cost function. though the definition of the antinucleolus rule, i.e. successively maximizing minimal excesses, seems to be counterintuitive, there are examples of cost Ž sharing situations for which the antinucleolus rule can be justified see . Potters and Sudholter, 1995 . Therefore, we also analyze the antinucleolus rule * in this paper.
Ž
In order to characterize the game theoretical cost sharing rules Shapley . rule, nucleolus rule, and antinucleolus rule , which are determined by the cost function evaluated at the aggregate demands of the coalitions, one additional property referring to the induced games is needed. Indeed, Ž . Ž . Ž average cost pricing satisfies all properties i ᎐ ix see Moulin and Shenker, . 1994 
Ž . Covariance on a set of games is an intuitive property. Two games N,Ž . Ž and N, w which coincide up to strategical equivalence i.e., w s ␣ и¨q ␤ N . for some ␣ ) 0 and ␤ g ‫ޒ‬ should be treated accordingly by a solution concept for games. In the context of cost sharing problems COV seems less intuitive. Nevertheless, as long as the induced game serves as an adequate description of the cost sharing problem, covariance can be interpreted as in the original game theoretical context. Note that a similar Ž . approach can be found in McLean and Sharkey 1994 , who use a strong additivity assumption which applies to the games derived by cost sharing problems.
If a CSR on a set ⌫ of cost sharing problems satisfies COV, then Ž . there is a unique continuation on the set G G ⌫ of games which are strategically equivalent to the induced game of some CSP in ⌫. To put it
Clearly is feasible, iff is feasible. Well-known properties for
If N, w arises from N,¨by a permutation of the players then ''respects this permutation.''
Clearly the following statements for a covariant CSR on ⌫, together with its continuation , hold true: Ranking has an analogue for solution concepts, too. Indeed, many wellknown solution concepts, e.g. the Shapley value and the proposed versions of nucleoli, preserve the desirability relation in the sense of Maschler and
Note that the Shapley rule and both nucleolus rules and * satisfy Ž . COV, PO, RAN, SC, ET, NP, and AN see, e.g., Peleg, 1989 . Moreover, Ž the Shapley rule satisfies ADD and MMADD see Shapley, 1953, and . Dubey, 1975 . For completeness reasons we present an example which shows that neither nor or * satisfy MON. 
Hence the game theoretical cost sharing rules do not satisfy MON even in the case of concave cost functions.
For every finite nonvoid subset N of U let ⌫ denote the set of cost N sharing problems with agent set N. The following assertion shows the ''power'' of COV.
The proof of this lemma is constructive and several versions of it will be used.
Moreover, let C be defined by C y s max¨S q ␤ S N S : N and q S F y for y G 0.
. Clearly C is a cost function C 0 s 0 and C is nondecreasing . In order to verify that¨C , q s¨q ␤ holds true, it remains to prove
By definition of q there is a unique i g N such that i g T _ S and
A stronger version of this result shows that ET and ET are equivalent for a covariant CSR and its continuation. We repeat the construction presented in the proof of Lemma 1.6. Namely, Ž 1 . Ž 2 . take d G d¨k d¨, define ␤ and q as in the mentioned proof and let C i be the cost function for¨i q ␤, i.e.
MMADD of and COV of imply < < T : N; 0, otherwise for S : N , then we proceed by induction on T . If < < Ž . Ž . T s 1, then ¨s ¨by COV, because¨is strategically equivalent to < < the flat game. If T G 2, then take i, j g T, i / j, observe that¨s¨T _Äi4 Ž .
Ž . n¨, and, thus, ¨s ¨by ET, NP, MMADD, feasibility, and the T _Ä j4 inductive hypothesis applied to¨and¨. We proceed by induction
If t¨s 1, then¨is the flat game. If t¨s 2, then¨is a positive multiple of the maximum of finitely many unanimity Ž . Ž . games, thus ¨s ¨by MMADD and the fact that the minimum of Ž . finitely many unanimity games is a unanimity game. If t¨s t G 3, then let a, b, c denote the three highest worths of coalitions:
Define three monotonic games¨1,¨2, w bÿ
and observe that¨s¨1 k¨2. The inductive hypothesis can be applied to where k denotes the number of nonnullplayers of the induced game. Clearly satisfies NP, ET, and PO. MMADD and COV are not strong enough to rule out the CSR on this small set of cost sharing problems. One reason can be seen in the fact that the class of induced games is too small. Indeed, every induced game is not only a monotone simple game but also a weighted majority game.
Ž . In the end of this section it is shown that NP and ADD or MMADD can be replaced by a reduction property in the sense of Hart and MasColell. Certainly ⌫ has to be replaced by some richer class of cost sharing N Ž . problems, namely by ⌫ U . The next definition recalls the notions of a ''reduced game'' and ''consistency.'' Moreover, the analogues for cost sharing problems are presented.
Ž .
DEFINITION 2.4. Let be a CSR on ⌫ U and be a solution concept and for every л / T : S rule to be the total cost for the aggregate demand of itself and S diminished by the aggregate fee which will be paid by S c in the new situation. It should be noted that coalition T imagines a situation in which only its own agents and the agents of S c are present. A different reduced situation will be discussed in the following two sections.
Ž . THEOREM 2.5. The Shapley rule is the unique cost sharing rule on ⌫ U satisfying ET, COV, and CON.
Proof. It suffices to show the uniqueness part. Let be a CSR with Ž . the desired properties. Then the continuation on G G s G G U of satisfies COV and ET by Corollary 1.8. Moreover, is PO on 1-agent cost sharing problems by COV. The proof is finished as soon it is verified that Ž . satisfies CON and PO. In order to show CON and PO take N,¨g G G, Ž . л/S:N, and assume that R,¨is Pareto optimal for every proper subset л / R m N. First of all it is proved that there is an induced gamẽ Ž . Ž . Ž . N,w of some CSP N, C, q which is strategically equivalent to N,s uch that the -reduced game w is the induced game of the -reduced 
Ž . where w s u q ␤. Clearly C y s C y for y F q S and C is nondecreasing, thus a cost function. The straightforward observation thatC
shows that¨s w holds true. By construction, Pareto optimality oñ proper subproblems and COV of , the -reduced function C is a cost In view of these considerations the associated CSR on ⌫ U shows the independence of ET. In view of the definition it can easily be seen that average cost pricing satisfies CON, thus independence of COV is < < guaranteed for U G 2. Finally the nucleolus rule shows that CON cannot < < be dropped as a prerequisite of Theorem 2.5 in case U G 3.
THE NUCLEOLUS RULE
There is a characterization of the prenucleolus on the family of all games with the player set contained in an infinite universe due to Sobolev Ž . 1975 . He needs a consistency property based on a certain reduced game Ž . introduced by Davis and Maschler 1965 . The corresponding notion and its analogue in the cost sharing situation is content of Ž . DEFINITION 3.1. Let be a CSR on ⌫ : ⌫ U and be a solution 
Ž .
S, x c c
ŽNote that the reduced function, although it is nondecreasing, it need not Ž . . be a cost function, since C 0 might be negative.
Ž . and x s N, C, q the following condition is satisfied:
, q . Here y denotes the positive part of the real num-
Ž . An interpretation of CONS is similar to that of CON see Section 2 . The main difference is that a coalition T takes an ''optimistic'' view of the c Ž world; every coalition R of members of S who agreed upon the proposal . given by can be taken as a coalition of partners. Therefore the total cost generated by the aggregate demand of the union T j R can be ''reduced'' by the fee which will be paid by R. Moreover, it should be noted that T imagines a situation with respect to the grand coalition in which all members of S c have already paid their fees. The ''pessimistic'' view of the world will be discussed in Section 4.
Ž . Ž . Remark 3.2. i A solution concept on G G U which satisfies CONS
Ž . induces a CSR on ⌫ U which satisfies CONS but not necessarily Ž . Ž . SCONS, since C 0 s 0 is not necessarily true for x s N, C, q .
S, x
Indeed, the prenucleolus and thus the nucleolus rule are consistent. Nevertheless, the nucleolus rule does not satisfy SCONS as examples Ž Ž .. show. The objection that the definition of the reduced function see 1 should be modified by, e.g., taking the positive part of this function, can be countered as follows. In the interpretation presented above it is hard to justify that only certain coalitions take the optimistic view of the world and Ž . others throw away money. Moreover, the idea that at least the nucleolus rule should satisfy CONS excludes this modification as the following example shows: Ä 4 Ž . Ž . ii It should be noted that it is not known whether there is any Ž . < < Pareto optimal CSR on ⌫ U satisfying SCONS, unless U F 2. SCONS is only used in the context of cost sharing problems with concave cost Ž . functions see Theorem 3.3 .
Ž .
Ž . iii Note that average cost pricing satisfies CONS on ⌫ U . A proof of this property is straightforward and skipped.
For any set ⌫ of cost sharing problems let ⌫* denote the subset of cost sharing problems with concave cost functions within ⌫. This consideration shows that any reduced function is itself a cost function in case is the CSR. Moreover, it is not necessary to distinguish whether Ž . Ž . Ž . y exceeds or does not exceed q S in equality 1 . The first row of 1 can be taken as definition in this special case. Therefore reducing does not destroy concavity. Up to now we have shown that CONS and SCONS cannot be distinguished for the nucleolus rule on cost sharing problems with concave cost functions. By the choice of the set of cost sharing Ž . Ž . problems every reduced CSP is a member of ⌫* U ; thus Sobolev's 1975 result shows that the nucleolus rule possesses the desired properties.
To show uniqueness let be any CSR with the desired properties and its continuation. By COV is Pareto optimal on 1-agent cost sharing problems. CONS guarantees PO in general. The proof is complete as soon Ž . as it is verified that ¨belongs to the prekernel of¨for every Ž Ž .. Ž Ž . g G G ⌫* U . Recall that the prekernel of a game N,¨is the set Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley 1972 showed that the prekernel of a concave game is a singleton consisting of the prenucleolus Ž . . otherwise the proof is already finished . Without loss of generality let q F q . Define q s q for k g N and Q.E.D. Note that this characterization is in fact a characterization of the prekernel which can be generalized to the set of concave cost games with player sets contained in U. Ž Although the analogue of Lemma 1.6 does not hold i.e., it is not true that every concave cost game coincides, up to strategical equivalence, with Ž the induced game of some CSP with a concave cost function see Section .. 4 , COV cannot be dropped, because average cost pricing satisfies ET and SCONS but it does not coincide with the nucleolus rule if U contains Ž . different agents. Sudholter 1993 presents examples which show that ET is independent unless U is a singleton. The Shapley rule satisfies ET and < < COV but SCONS fails for U G 3.
It should be remarked that it is not known whether CONS is strong enough to replace SCONS in Theorem 3.3. Nevertheless, the present approach shows that within this restricted family of cost sharing problems Ž . strong consistency which seems to be more intuitive than CONS can easily be satisfied. The general case requires CONS. SCONS is not satisfied even for average cost pricing. Proof. It is sufficient to show uniqueness. Let be a CSR with the Ž . desired properties and let be its continuation . Sobolev 1975 showed that has to coincide with , if satisfies COV, AN, and CONS. Orshan Ž . 1993 showed that AN can be replaced by ET. In view of Corollary 1.8 it suffices to show that satisfies CONS. A further modification of the proof Ž . of Lemma 1.6 which is similar to that of Theorem 2.5 shows that is Ž . Ž . consistent. Indeed, if N,¨g G G U and S is a nonvoid coalition in N, then there is a demand profile q and a cost function C such that There are examples which show the logical independence of the proper-Ž ties as well as the necessity of the infinity assumption see Sudholter, . 1993 .
THE ANTINUCLEOLUS RULE
In this section we present an axiomatization of the antinucleolus by ET, COV, and dual consistency. Moreover, it is shown that the antinucleolus rule is in the core, if the cost function is concave. 
. л/S:N, and x s N, C, q the following condition is satisfied:
Note that nondecreasing in iv only means C y FC q N y x S .
S, x
The main difference between CONS and DCONS is that the ''optimistic'' view is replaced by the ''pessimistic'' view of coalition T : S. Every c Ž . coalition R of members of S who agreed upon the proposal given by has to be considered as possible coalition of partners of T. Therefore the total cost generated by the aggregate demand of the union T j R can be ''reduced'' by the fee which will be paid by R in the ''worst'' case.
Note that DCONS for induced games implies DCONS for the cost sharing problems. The proof of the next theorem is similar to that of Theorem 3. 4 
of preimputations which minimize the maximal nontrivial excess. As a Ž . matter of fact the nucleolus ¨is a member of the least core. 
which establishes a contradiction to the fact S g M M. Therefore S : S in this case. Ž . Ž . < < If q S ) q S , then take such S that S is minimal. If S l S / л, take i g S l S and observe that Ä 4 Ä 4 Ž Ž .. This last lemma shows that the set G G ⌫* U of games strategically equivalent to the induced game of some CSP with concave cost function is a ''small'' subset of the set of all concave games with player set contained Ž in U. Note that concavity is closed under strategical equivalence; i.e., the game is concave, iff every game, which is strategically equivalent to the . initial game, is concave. This can be seen with the help of examples. There is a concave game such that the least core of its dual does not even Ž . intersect the core of the game see Sudholter, 1997, Example 3.2.3 .
. The antinucleolus of a CSP N, C, q with conca¨e C is in the core of its induced cost game¨C
, q .
COINCIDENCE OF COST SHARING RULES
This section serves to classify the set of cost functions such that the mentioned cost sharing rules, namely the Shapley rule and both nucleolus rules and *, coincide with average cost pricing a a for every demand profile. We shall say that a cost function C satisfies the coincidence Ž . property CP at ␣ for some
holds true for every agent set N with two agents and every demand profile 
Ž . THEOREM 5.1. i A cost function satisfies CP at ␣, if and only if
The typical shape of a cost function satisfying CP is sketched in Fig. 2 . Ž . Note that in assertion ii of this theorem n s 2 is not assumed. The nucleolus rule, the antinucleolus rule, average cost pricing, and the Shapley rule coincide for any cost sharing problem with a cost function satisfying CP at the aggregate demand of the agents.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let C be any cost function. For ␣ s 0 both assertions are trivially satisfied, thus ␣ ) 0 is assumed from now on. Take Ä 4 Ž . any y with 0 -y -␣ and define N s 1, 2 , q s y, ␣ y y . Standardness of the Shapley value shows that
Average cost pricing yields
This shows that and a a coincide on N, C, q , if and only if
Ž . Ä 4 Ž . which is equivalent to 2 . For y g ␣, 0 equality 2 is trivially satisfied.
Ž . Ž . Ž . In order to prove ii let N, C, q be any CSP such that q N s ␣ and
The explicit formula for the Shapley value see Shapley, . 1953 yields
For the nucleolus rules and * Kohlberg's approach is used. At x the Ž . Ž .
c C , q Ž Ž .. excess x S y¨S coincides with that of S , where¨s¨by 2 . Therefore the balancedness criteria show that both nucleolus rules coincide with average cost pricing.
Q.E.D.
COROLLARY 5.2. A cost function satisfying CP at ␣ is continuous, if it is
Ä 4 restricted to y N 0 F y F ␣ .
Ž .
Proof. This assertion can be shown with the help of 2 and monotonicity of a cost function C. If C satisfies CP at ␣ then the slope of C is Ž . bounded from below by 0 by definition. Equality 2 shows that the slope is Ž . bounded from above by 2 и C ␣ , whence C is restricted to the interval
and both summands are nonnegative.
Q.E.D.
Ž For ␣ G 0 the proposed cost sharing rules Shapley rule , both nucleo-.
lus rules and *, and average cost pricing a a can be characterized on the set ⌫ of cost sharing problems with cost functions satisfying CP at ␣, Ž . where ␣ is the aggregate demand. Indeed, Moulin and Shenker 1994 showed that average cost pricing is the unique CSR satisfying Pareto optimality, separable costs, and monotonicity on sets of cost sharing The following recursive formulae y s k 2 и y y y y y q k 2 y q y y y 6 Ž . Ž . Ž. Ž . are obviously valid for k s 1, 2. By induction on k it can be shown that 6 , Ž .
Ž . 7 are generally true. Indeed, for k G 3 first of all the application of 5 Ž . Ž . Ž . with m s 1 shows 6 . Second, 5 applied to m s k y 1 shows 7 . The necessary computations are straightforward and skipped.
With s 2 y q y y y and s y y y y y we obtain 2 1 3 3 2 1 C 1 sC 2nи ⌬ s y s n 2 и q n и , Ž . Ž .
2n
C 2 s C 4n и ⌬ s y s 4n 2 и q 2 n и both by 6 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . 
Ž . Ž . Ž .
sen as in the proof of Lemma 1. 6 . This lemma and the definition of a a Ž . directly show that N, C, q possesses the desired properties. In view of these facts a possible characterization of all cost sharing problems, for which average cost pricing, the nucleolus rules, and the Shapley rule coincide, requests and implies a characterization of all TU games, for which the Shapley value, the prenucleolus, and the antinucleolus coincide. Of course, this author cannot supply any characterization of the foregoing type. Table I shows the properties of the cost sharing rules discussed in this paper. A ''y'' means that the corresponding CSR does not satisfy this property, at least on the set of all cost sharing problems with the agent set contained in some universe U of more than two members. The symbols ''q'' and ''['' mean that the corresponding property is satisfied or belongs to the axiomatization respectively. With a finite subset N of U such that n G 3 and ␣ ) 0 the following Ž . Ž . three tables summarize the presented axiomatizations on ⌫ , ⌫ U , ⌫* U , N Ž . and on the set ⌫ of cost sharing problems N, C, q with cost functions C Ž . satisfying the coincidence property at ␣ , where ␣ s q N is the aggregate demand of the agents. The abbreviation ''M-S'' indicates that this axioma-Ž . tization is due to Moulin and Shenker 1994 . The numbers refer to the theorems or to the sections where these results are proved. Table II treats cost sharing rules on cost sharing problems ⌫ with a fixed agent set.
SUMMARIZING DIAGRAMS

N
Ž .
Although Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 also hold for ⌫ U , Table III neither mentions this fact nor repeats the characterization of average cost pricing. These axiomatizations are strongly based on ''varying sets of agents,'' i.e. Ž . on consistency principles see Sections 2᎐4 .
Table IV presents the common axiomatizations on the set ⌫ of cost sharing problems with cost function satisfying the coincidence property at the aggregate demand of the agents. 
